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INTRODUCTION
When the European Commission launched its legendary programme, 'Completion of the Internal Market' in the mid eighties, 1 both proponents and critics expected broad deregulation and a 'race to the bottom' wherein EC Member States sought to defend or strengthen economic competitiveness by loosening the regulatory grip. Regulation was considered a cost, and de-regulation a gain in efficiency. These expectations were thoroughly disappointed. Instead, we witnessed new trends in regulation and juridification 
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-intense re-regulation, new forms of co-operation among governmental and nongovernmental actors, and the promotion of a range of participation entitlements such as opening policy-making processes to civil society. Within Europe, free trade and marketbuilding objectives were accomplished in conjunction with the establishment of complex regulatory machinery, especially in 'social regulation', such as the protection of health, safety and environmental interests. 3 To use the terminology of the Bremen Chapter One of this volume, the post-national constellation which Europeanization has generated leads to an erosion of the regulatory powers of the democratic, constitutional, interventionist state (the 'DCIS'), and of its capability to weigh the costs and benefits of opening the national economy autonomously. But Europeanization has also led to the establishment of sophisticated transnational governance arrangements which nation states could not have accomplished on their own.
Are there lessons to be learnt from the European experience for the organisation of This essay is going to explore this bundle of questions in three steps:
In Section I, we will summarize the European experience with an emphasis on Europe's their critique of the use of law to domesticate class conflicts (cf., Teubner 1987: 9) . It hence carries with it a perception of the ambivalent effects of the use of law, which were characterized first as depoliticization and later, e.g., (and most famously) as a destruction of social relations, a 'colonialisation of the life-world' by Habermas (1985) ; cf. the recent thorough reconstruction by Humrich 2004: 4 ff. 'Legalization' analysis, as presented by Abbott et al. (2000) , is not linked to these traditions and their critical normative agenda. Pertinent studies explore parallels and difference between the subjection of political process to rule of law requirements within states and the causes and consequences of rule-bound governance beyond the nations states (cf., Zangl/Zürn 2004; Zürn 2005 ; see, also, Section III 2 infra. But there is no consensus among political scientists and legal sociologists and theorists on the proper use of both terms. 3 We are following the definitions of Majone (1989) and Selznick (1985) .
institutional ingenuity as it embedded its market-building efforts in the construction of sophisticated regulatory machinery as a key part of the European multi-level system of governance.
The regulatory choices open to the international trade system are, of course, more narrow, as we show in Section II. Its institutional centre, the World Trade Organisation, simply does not have the kind of regulatory powers on which Europe can rely. However, the strengthening of international commitments to free trade objectivesachieved in 1994 through the replacement of the former GATT by the new WTO regime -was not as one-dimensional as it is often portrayed in political arenas. The new WTO regime is a compound of governance arrangements which deal with non-tariff barriers to trade, i.e., with exactly the type of regulatory concerns to which Europe has responded in its regulatory policies since the mid 80s. In Section II, we will underline that the shift from the old GATT to the new WTO regime needs to be understood as a twofold process in which the regulatory autonomy of nation states is eroded while their regulatory concerns are built into the new transnational governance arrangements.
'Governance' has become a buzz-word which has substituted the term regulation in many contexts. The new term has come into use at all 'levels of governance', first, in international relations, then, in the EU, and also within nation states. In section III, we will summarize the recent career of this concept, and point to its older equivalents in primarily normative and legal perspectives. The turn to novel forms of governance, it is submitted, is both a response to the impasses of traditional regulatory techniques, and a challenge to the notions of legitimacy which we have learned to appreciate within our national constitutional democracies.
We are focusing on a particular segment of transnational governance, namely, the interfaces and tensions between the promotion of free trade and the defence of regulatory concerns. We are interested in the potential of 'legalization' 5 strategies to resolve these tensions. The scope of our inquiries in this essay, 6 will, however, be quite narrow. While the term 'social regulation' as we have just introduced it, comprises the regulation of safety at work and environmental protection, we will restrict our discussion to patterns of product regulation. This relatively narrow scope will allow us to look at the background context of these commitments with some intensity. In particular, we will pay attention to the 'governance arrangements' which substantiate and complement those commitments and seek to determine whether these arrangements should be understood as the functional equivalents of the administrative infrastructure of nation states. They 5 See note 6 supra.
6
Not the project mentioned in note*! The full text of the application to the German Science Foundation is available (in German) at <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/ with a summary in English.
Sfb 597 "Staatlichkeit im Wandel" -"Transformations of the State" (WP 17) seem to us to represent a new type of 'juridification' in the international system, which neither traditional international law, nor the other disciplines of international administrative and economic law could, heretofore, conceptualise. 7 But even in this respect, our project is far from being comprehensive in its scope and ambitions. 8 To rephrase these observations: we are interested in the erosion of the regulatory autonomy of nationstates and of their ability to ensure compliance with their constitutional commitments.
We are equally interested in the building up of transnational regulatory capacities. We therefore explore the transnational governance arrangements and seek to understand the peculiar legitimacy of their problématique. This changing domestic/international interface could well amount to one of the major transformations of the state after its 'Golden Age'.
I. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: FREE TRADE AS INSTIGATOR OF REGULATORY INNOVATION
The re-regulatory and modernizing side-effects of the 'completion' of the European Internal Market remain puzzling, but are so well documented 9 that we can refrain from reporting them in any detail. What we will focus on, instead, are the governance patterns which Europe has developed in its search for integration strategies that ensure the compatibility of the logic of market-building with the market-correcting logic of social regulation. If we understand these patterns as responses to the political weight that regulatory concerns for the protection of health, safety and the environment have gained, we will have to deal with their functionally equivalent developments at international level. In a comparison of European and international responses to non-tariff barriers to trade, it is important to underline that the ECJ's celebrated argument can easily be translated into the language of a much older discipline, namely, that of conflict of laws. What the ECJ did in substance was to identify a 'meta-norm' which both France and Germany, as parties to the conflict, could accept. Since both countries were committed to the free trade objective, they were also prepared to accept that restrictions of free trade must be based on credible regulatory concerns. Further examples of this type of conflict resolution at the WTO level will be mentioned in Section II 1. Its principal and metajuridical importance becomes immediately apparent once we take the fact that marketcreating and market-correcting regulatory policies are nothing exceptional into account.
Without going into the theoretical underpinnings of this argument in any depth, we simply submit here that trade with ever more sophisticated products 'requires' the development of regulatory machinery to ensure the 'trustworthiness' of such products to both traders and consumers (Block 2005; Vos 2004 The new approach achieved precisely this through a bundle of interrelated measures:
European legislation was confined to laying down 'essential safety requirements', whereas the task of detailing the general requirements was delegated to the experts of European and national standardisation organisations. The involvement of nongovernmental actors involved a de facto 'delegation' of law-making powers, which could not be openly admitted. Harm Schepel 13 cites a leading representative of the standardisation community: the new method 'makes it possible to distinguish better between those aspects of Community harmonisation activities which fall within the province of the law, and those which fall within the province of technology, and to differentiate between matters which fall within the competence of public authorities and those which are the responsibility of manufacturers and importers' (Nicolas 1995: 94) .
The language covers and hides the political dimensions of standardisation. This is small wonder, because the advocates of the new approach had to present their project in legally acceptable clothes. They were perfectly aware of the limited guidance that 'essential safety requirements' can offer in the standardisation process. But they had good reasons to trust in the responsibility of the standardisation process -and the potential of national and European public authorities to intervene, should that trust be disappointed/betrayed/misplaced (Falke 2001; Schepel 2005 : 403 ff.).
I.3
Administering the Internal Market: the comitology system and European agencies Independent agencies were the core institutions advocated by Giandomenico Majone (e.g. 1989 in his design of a European 'regulatory state'. Majone's suggestions attracted a great deal of attention but were never implemented. Europe has, however, adopted his term and established an impressive number of bodies which are called agencies (Chiti 2003) . What these bodies are, or will become, is indeterminate. This much is uncontested: agencies are certainly not self-sufficient bureaucratic entities.
Charged with the regulation of market entry and exit, or with more general informal, and policy-informing, information-gathering duties, these new European entities meet a technical demand for market-corrective and sector-specific regulation. In their public presentation, it is often submitted that their functions are primarily technocratic. This is what they may accomplish best, and such a function seems well compatible with their semi-autonomous status, and the expectation that they should also give voice to private market interests. It is equally compatible with the thesis that 'administering' the Internal
Market has more to do with the 'neutral' sustenance of individual economic enterprises than with the imposition of (collective) Weberian type of administrative machinery. They all leave room, and build upon, the institutionalisation of political (deliberative) processes.
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II. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION: A SURVEY OF CONFLICT-RESOLVING AND POLICY-INTEGRATING
MECHANISMS
European law and WTO law represent different legal worlds. So obvious and significant are the institutional discrepancies that comparisons between them, which seek to draw upon the experiences of both institutions, are often considered as being all too risky.
And yet, some obvious functional equivalents seem to merit closer scrutiny. 14 Both institutions have to balance free trade objectives and regulatory concerns, or, as the Appellate Body in the Hormones case put it: 'the shared, but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting … life and health'. 15 The non-tariff barriers to trade to which the proponents of international free trade had to pay ever more attention in the last decades are requirements which the EU tends to recognize as legitimate restrictions to the freedom of intra-Community trade. The SPS and the TBT Agreements are institutionalised responses to health and safety concerns, and the legitimacy of trade restrictions resulting from environmental policies is explicitly recognized in the preamble of the WTO Agreement.
Our exploration of these parallels in this section will deal with conflict resolutions under these agreements. We will, on the one hand, contrast juridified and judicialized resolution as opposed to political conflict resolution. We will focus here 16 on 'product' as opposed to 'process' regulation, and the governance patterns in this area. Both of these distinctions refer to separate debates, but are nevertheless interdependent. Product regulation is obviously more closely linked to the realisation of free trade than process regulation, because product related mandatory requirements can hinder the importation of goods directly, whereas process regulation need not affect the quality of the output of production. Stricter and more costly standards can be a competitive disadvantage. Conflicts arising from such differences are often primarily economic. But the distinction is of limited use: environmental and safety at work requirements may relate to the product itself; low environmental standards may have external effects on other countries; safetyat-work standards may have a human rights basis; and, last but not least, international agreements often do not apply the product/process distinction. Suffice it here to point to 14 Cf., Scott 2002 Scott , 2004 de Búrca 2002; Peel 2004 (Peel' s comparative observations on the differences between the US, the EU and the WTO are all interesting and helpful, and also quite sensitive to the differences between these polities and regimes, although they could have paid more attention to the specifics of transnational policy formation).
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the mentioning of 'measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health' in the Preamble and in Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement. It seems nevertheless plausible to assume that the juridification of transnational product regulation will be more intense than transnational standardisation in the field of safety at work and environmental protection. To put it slightly differently, the latter can probably be better explained by political processes, whereas the former will more often be dictated by functional necessities.
II.1 Alternatives to substantive transnationalism: proceduralized policy co-ordination through conflict-of-laws methodologies
As underlined in the previous section, the celebrated jurisprudence of the ECJ on Article 28 EC, which seeks to 'harmonize' the principle of freedom of intra-Community trade with the respect for the legitimate regulatory concerns of EC Member States can be understood as a modernization of conflicts law because this jurisprudence seeks to identify meta-norms which the jurisdictions involved can accept as a supra-nationally valid yardstick for evaluating and correcting their legislation. The same holds true for the reports of the WTO Appellate Body which assesses the compatibility of health and safety related non-tariff barriers to trade with the SPS Agreement. To generalize this observation, the SPS Agreement does not invoke some supranational legislative authority. It provides a framework within which WTO Members are to seek a resolution of conflicts arising from the extra-territorial impact of their regulatory policies. To become aware of these parallels is not just doctrinally interesting, but also practically relevant because a conflict-of-laws approach is politically much 'softer' than the imposition of a supranational substantive rule -Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaїdis 17 could hardly call 'constitutionalization' through a conflict-of-laws approach 'a step too far'.
18
The modern legal history of conflict of laws and its methodology is part of the political history of the sovereign nation state, and the conceptualisation of international relations by the various legal disciplines is based on the same paradigm as traditional theo- 
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'judicialization' of international conflicts is a challenge to legal theory 21 -an aspect which political scientists should take seriously.
22
Once one has become aware of these difficulties, the virtues of the conflict-of-laws alternative to true substantive supranationalism become apparent. The search for a conflict norm can be understood as a 'proceduralization' 23 of the conflict between competing validity claims, as a search for a meta-norm to which parties can commit themselves in a search for a solution to their conflict without betraying their loyalty to their own law. To take up the trivial Cassis case again, France does not need to adapt the alcohol content of its liqueur to German legal requirements, while Germany can continue to protect the expectations of its consumers. Both jurisdictions can live with a consumer information requirement. However, solutions of this kind are not always as unproblematic and soft as the Cassis case. The transatlantic conflict over hormones in beef provides an instructive example. 24 The US and (most of the Member States of) the EU are in disagreement regarding the addition of growth promoting hormones to beefproducing cattle. Can both parties agree to expose their practices to a science-based analysis of the health risks which the consumption of hormone enhanced beef may entail? The requirement in the SPS Agreement that the measures of the WTO Member must not be 'maintained without sufficient scientific evidence' (Article 2.2) and that it must be 'based on' a risk assessment (Article 5) seems to suggest exactly that. But, as the involved actors know all too well, a meta-norm referring to science as an arbitrator is not so innocent. Three reasons are sufficient here 25 to illustrate this point: firstly, sci-21 Nobody has ever pointed this out more provocatively and stringently than Brainerd Currie in his search for a new choice-of-law methodology. Currie's views were-since the time of their presentation in the late 50s and early 60s until today -perceived as a break with the traditions of American conflicts law, let alone continental private international law, that was nothing less than revolutionary. Laws, statutes and even common law rules, Currie argued, should be read as pursuing some policy. His real assault on the citadels of private international law, however, were the implications of this realist insights for intrastate settings: The application and implementation of policy-guided laws, he submitted, will often be backed by the 'interests' of that state (Currie's unfortunate term:
'governmental interests'), which courts must not disregard (Currie 1963c) . It is not compatible with the judicial function in constitutional democracies, Currie concluded, that courts balance competing state interests (Currie 1963c ). To rephrase these objections in more contemporary terms, the courts of national states are neither legitimated nor well equipped to address the challenges of transnational governance. Such theses may sound provocative, but are to be taken seriously (see Section III.3 infra).
22 See Stone Sweet 1997, but also note 29 infra.
23 On this term, cf., Section III 1 infra. 24 Cf., note 20 supra and out of an enormous number of comments Godt 1998; Joerges 2001; Perez 2004 : 115 ff.
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ence does not typically answer the questions that policy-makers and lawyers unambiguously pose; secondly, and even more importantly, it cannot resolve ethical and normative controversies; thirdly, consumer anxieties about 'scientifically speaking' marginal risks may be so considerable that policy-makers cannot neglect them.
26
It is submitted that, all of these difficulties notwithstanding, a conflict-of-laws approach to regulatory differences offers an often viable alternative to a search for substantive transnational rules. This alternative is less intrusive and therefore easier to accept. Even where the meta-norms remain indeterminate, they may nevertheless help to structure the controversies among the parties to a conflict by re-opening political, potentially deliberative, processes. Conflicts-of-laws is, in cases of true conflicts, in the last instance, a political exercise, as Brainerd Currie once argued. 27 This does not, however, exclude the proposition that conflict rules may be strong enough to guide the solution of conflicts. And even where they are not, the 'shadow of the law' may be sufficient to promote international comitas or diplomacy. 28 The borderlines are not as strict as legal formalists tend to portray them.
In conclusion, the history of the American-European conflict over the use of growth promoting hormones documents that 'judicialization' -i.e., 'the presence of binding third party enforcement' 29 -which the WTO has achieved through the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) does not guarantee definite solutions, but may instead initiate a re-politicisation of the whole process. Is this a failure, an advantage, or simply unavoidable? We will return to this question further on. 30 Suffice it to note here that the parallels with the EU system's potential to change from legalization to political processes are striking, and that the boundaries between conflict mediation through proceduralizing conflict-of-laws methodologies and the establishment of transnational governance arrangements are of gradual, rather than principal, significance.
II.2 Limits of juridification: the example of health-related transnational governance arrangements
There are, so we have concluded in the introductory remarks, many (functional) reasons which militate in favour of internationally valid product standards. Unsurprisingly, international standardisation is indeed taking place on a great scale in the ISO, the (non- The SPS Agreement pursues a very similar strategy which proved to be quite effective.
36
Prior to the adoption of the SPS Agreement, the impact of the CAC standards was apparently quite limited. They had no legal significance whatsoever. The SPS Agreement, which, in Article 3.1 requires that WTO Members 'base' SPS measures on international standards, guidelines and recommendations, has changed the situation quite dramatically. Legally speaking, the SPS requirement is clearly much less than a mandatory supranationally valid rule. The 'right' of WTO Members to determine the risk level that their constituency has to live with is de jure not at issue. Instead, the SPS Agreement has to build upon an incentive strategy which is similar to the safety 'presumption' upon which the European New Approach to harmonisation and standards rests. Its Article 3.2 provides that national 'sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.' In this way, Article 3.2 SPS imports these norms into the WTO system.
Our observations so far have not (yet) dealt with the legitimacy of transnational governance but are only concerned with the strategies through which transnational product regulation is achieved. As has become apparent, neither the TBT nor the SPS Agreement seek to prescribe a substantive uniform yardstick for the weighing of the costs and benefits of product standards; instead, they remain akin to a conflict-of-laws approach in that they identify meta-norms which help to mediate the conflicting economic interests and regulatory concerns. In the case of the SPS Agreement, 'science' is the most visible guidepost. 'Science' does not, however, figure as some objective super-standard which could prescribe the contents of regulatory decisions. The function of appeals to 'science' is to discipline and rationalise regulatory debates. But even this cautious interpretation of the potential function of commitments to 'science' needs to be further qualified. The beef hormones saga, which is of exemplary importance here, did not end in any precise agreement about the kind of scientific evidence that the parties to the conflict must submit. 37 The Report of the Appellate Body even explicitly recognized that: The TBT Agreement and the ISO, as well as the SPS Agreement and the CAC, provide a framework for the elaboration of transnational product standards -a framework, which does, however, remain embedded in, and dependent upon, political processes.
II.3 Two interim observations
Our analysis warrants two concluding observations from which the issues to be discussed in the next session follow with a compelling logic.
The first concerns the emergence of transnational 'law'. Juridification processes which respond to concerns of social regulation, so we have argued, are most likely in the field of product safety requirements. However, neither the WTO-TBT-ISO nor the WTO-SPS-CAC norm production can be equated with the processes of law-making and regulation in constitutional democracies. The co-ordination and norm-generating mechanisms that we observe may be more adequately, albeit somewhat vaguely, characterised as 'governance arrangements' -and 'governance' is the category which we will explore first.
39
The second observation concerns the relationship between law and politics, i.e., the embeddedness of juridification in political processes at transnational level. The intensity of this dependence is a matter of degree. Where conflicts can be resolved through choice-of-law approaches, the law is relatively strong, albeit 'imperfect', in that it refrains from imposing substantive rules with supranational validity claims. Where transnational governance 'needs' substantive rules, be it in the field of product or process regulation, the intensity of political supervision is stronger. Our conclusion may sound vague and daring to political or social scientists but it also seems unavoidable to lawyers. A hypothesis may suffice at this point: we assume that the tensions between law and politics need to be rephrased as the legitimacy problematique of transnational governance. This is the second issue to which the following section will turn.
III. THE TURN TO GOVERNANCE AND ITS DISTINCT LEGITIMACY
PROBLÉMATIQUE
Governance has become an extremely popular concept in Europe ever since the President of the Commission used it in a programmatic speech delivered on 15 February One of the insights that this debate has produced is that the 'turn to governance' is by no means a purely European invention but has international and nation-state parallels.
'Governance' is a response to interdependent phenomena: to failures of traditional regulatory law, to the erosion of nation state governance and to the emergence of postnational constellations. The interdependence of these phenomena is the basis of our argument, which will be submitted in three steps. We start with a reflection on the national level. The 'turn to governance' was discovered, albeit in somewhat different terms, decades ago -and the responses developed since the 1980s remain attractive because the tribute they paid to functional necessities did not betray the law's proprium, its inherent links with the legitimacy problematique of governance practices (III 1). At
European level, the turn to governance came about for basically the same reasons as earlier changes had occurred within the nation-state since the European Community engaged in, or got entangled in, its 'political administration' of the Internal Market.
However, even though the similarities between the turn to governance at European and national level are striking, the European legitimacy problématique is distinct in one im- 
III.1 Governance practices in constitutional states: bringing the 80s back in
The seemingly irresistible career of the governance concept is new, although the phenomena it denotes are less so. In Germany, the inclusion of non-governmental actors into law-making processes and their participation in the political programmes governments design to resolve social problems is as old as that country's 'organized capitalism'. What is changing and new is the deliberate use and sophisticated design of contemporary 'modes' of governance in the context of privatization and deregulation strategies and risk society issues, and of Europeanisation and globalisation processes. That somewhat bold conclusion is, however, somewhat discredited by his observation, that American law reserves to itself the right to decide about the existence of a commitment under international law. Our probablöy idiosyncratic use of the notion underlines the difficulty of identifying conflict-of-laws solutions of general validity: no law is better than unjust law; to acknowledge that justice cannot be done is not to say that non-juridfication is to be eqated with a state of nature and a bellum# omnia erga ones.
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problématique of the turn to governance is too simplistic. What is at stake is not just the performance, but also the capability of the political and administrative system to deliver responses which the citizens of democratic states are constitutionally entitled to receive. To rephrase this issue in an older language, what is at issue here are the failures of the legal system of the modern welfare state, the Democratic Constitutional Interventionist State, the DCIS., 46 Its deficiencies have been on the legal theory agenda ever since lawyers became aware of implementation problems and joined the critique of political and legal interventionism that gave rise to the particularly intense debate in the 1980s.
Broad disappointment with 'purposive' legal programmes of economic management and a new degree of sensitivity towards 'intrusions into the life-world' 47 through social policy prescriptions mirrored the understanding that economic processes were embedded within societies in far more complex ways than a simple market-state dichotomy might suggest. This further triggered a search for new modes of legal rationality which were to replace interventionism and, by the same token, free themselves from the destructive myth that law might get a grip on social reality through the simple application of 'grand theories'. At the same time, however, 'proceduralisation' 48 and 'reflexive law' 49 were also concerned with very mundane issues such as the improvement of implementation and compliance. Discrepancies were clear between grand purposive legal programmes and their real world social impact: it became a core concern of legal sociology to establish soft-law and regulatory alternatives to command and control regulation. 50 In other words, law, concerned with both the effectiveness of economic and social regulation and its wider social legitimacy, was,very early on, drawn into the refashioning of constitutional and administrative legal spheres. Law was developing far more constructive and legitimate synergies between markets and hierarchies. The importance of these debates for the assessment of 'governance' practices has long gone unnoticedbut that may now change nonetheless.
51
III.2 Constitutionalising European governance practices through deliberative processes?
As our survey in Section I has documented, the most important and most successful innovations of European governance had been achieved before this concept became so popular. To recall the most prominent examples mentioned there: under the new ap- 46 For an elaboration of the argument, cf., Joerges 2005: 218-232. 47 Habermas 1985. 48 Wiethölter 1989; Habermas 1998 and Habermas 1999: 414-446 . 49 Teubner 1983. 50 Teubner 1987.
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proach to technical harmonisation and standards, non-governmental organisations with links to administrative bodies, industry, and expert communities are all engaged in longterm co-operative relationships. Europeanisation has managed to re-arrange these formerly national arrangements in such a manner that they operate across national lines and across various levels of governance. In the governance arrangements in the foodstuffs sector, the involvement of administrative bodies has been stronger-'food safety' has, for a long time, been a concern of public administration. This is why the role of bureaucracies in the European 'administration' of food safety through the comitology system was, and still is, stronger than in the field of standardisation. But it, too, has become a governance arrangement par excellence. Do such arrangements fit into our inherited notions of government, administration, and the separation of powers? Can such hybrids be legitimate? Is it at all conceivable that their legitimacy will be ensured by law?
These questions concern the 'nature' of the European polity, which is now widely characterized as a 'heterarchically' -as opposed to hierarchically -structured multilevel system which must organise its political action in networks. This thesis has farreaching implications. If the powers and resources for political action in the EU are located at various and relatively autonomous levels of governance, the coping with functionally interwoven problem-constellations will depend on the communication between the various actors who are relatively autonomous in their various domains, but who, at the same time, remain mutually dependent. Compelling normative reasons which militate in favour of such co-operative commitments can be derived directly from the postnational constellation in which the Member States of the EU find themselves. Their interdependence has become so intense that no state in Europe can take decisions of any political weight without causing 'extra-territorial' effects for its neighbours. Put provocatively, but nonetheless brought to its logical conclusion, the Member States of the EU have become unable to act democratically.
52
This is not a critique of some of the imperfections of the systems from which we would conclude that the European democratic deficit should not be taken too seriously.
Our point is more structural and principled. Individual European nation states cannot include all the non-national (European) citizens who will be affected by their decisions in their own electoral and will-formation processes. And vice versa, their own citizenry cannot influence 'foreign' political actors who are taking the relevant decisions for them. This is, of course, true for the 'DCIS' in general -and one of the reasons on which the legitimacy of conflict-of-law rules and transnational juridification rests. But within the EU, the interdependence of national societies is particularly significantand can also be attributed to the integration process itself. We conclude, that the debate on democracy in Europe is too one-sidedly concerned with the democracy deficits of the European construction. It neglects the structural democracy deficits of nation-state members. It fails to conceptualise the potential of European law to cure the democracy deficits of European nation-states. Such a vision of European law does not suggest 'democratising' the European institutions as if they were separate bodies. It seeks to conceptualise the whole of the European multi-level construction in such a way that the European polity will not just be compatible with, but even strengthen, democratic processes.
53
This is the task that Jürgen Neyer and the present writer have assigned to European law under the heading of 'deliberative' -as opposed to orthodox or quasi-statistsupranationalism. 54 We have argued that our normative claims are not pure fantasies but well-founded in important principles of European law: the Member States of the Union may not enforce their interests and their laws unboundedly. They are bound to respect European freedoms. They may not discriminate. They may only pursue 'legitimate' regulatory policies approved by the Community. They must co-ordinate with respect to what regulatory concerns they can follow, and design their national regulatory provisions in the most Community-friendly way.
In the field of social regulation, we have taken a further and more daring step: 55 the EU-specific context of risk regulation, so we suggested, favours a deliberative mode of interaction. Its epistemic components are not simply technocratic but embedded in broader normative practices of reasoning. Is it conceivable for law to strengthen such qualities of social regulation in the EU? Is it conceivable to 'constitutionalise' the European committee system so that its operation becomes compatible with essentials of the democratic ideals of policy-making? The answers we found have already (implicitly) been 54 Joerges/Neyer 1997. Good, or at least well-meaning, intentions do not cure theoretical failures. And vice versa, the often-repeated thesis that deliberative supranationalism is anti-democratic, or, at best, technocratic sounds odd to us and is particularly difficult to understand when brought forward together with the insight that the EU cannot develop into a state and hence is unable to realise/achieve state bound models of democracy.
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of semi-autonomous polities by identifying rules and principles that respect the autonomy of democratically legitimated units and restrict controls to their design. 'Deliberative Supranationalism Type II' should also cope with the apparently irresistible transformation of institutionalised government into under-legalized governance arrangements. It must avoid two dead-end alleys: it must come to terms with the new challenges cannot hope to get rid of governance practices through which legal systems have, at all levels, responded to the impasses of traditional (administrative, interventionist) regulation. It cannot hope to achieve at European level that which could not be accomplished at nati- All this may sound very attractive, but to assert that we could achieve the desired discipline without the visible and not always welcome force of law seems at best naïve (Schmalz-Bruns 2004; Scheuerman 2004) . The third way that 'societal constitutionalism' is pursuing (albeit quite tentatively as will be visible from the following section) assumes that the legitimacy-generating function of law can come to bear 'beyond the state' and 'beyond Europe'.
III.3 Conclusion: constitutionalising a transnational political administration
All the difficulties experienced by the law with respect to governance at national and at European level are present at international level, albeit in even more challenging variations.
Governance phenomena, as we have defined them in the preceding paragraphs, are responses to the regulatory 'needs' that the traditional legal system could not fulfil. The reasons for these failures and the learning processes that the law underwent at national and at European level provide the basis of the following concluding observations which will proceed in three steps. After, first, substantiating the specifics of the juridification of transnational market governance, we will, secondly, review three types of responses to its legitimacy problématique, namely, economic and technocratic rationality, transnational 'administrative' law and societal constitutionalism; where these approaches fail,
we have, thirdly, to rely on conflict of laws, comitas and diplomacy.
(1) 'Juridification' has intensified at international level in many respects. The empirical indicators are so strong that all legal disciplines, as well as political and social philosophy are in the process of re-defining their premises. Juridification in the postnational constellation is broadening in scope and deepening in its reach to such intensity that we have to take the notion of 'law without a state' seriously, as even Jürgen
Habermas concludes.
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The governance phenomena that this essay is exploring concern just one segment of these developments. This segment may even seem quite mundane in its importance. It is, however, theoretically particularly challenging because it concerns regulatory issues and governance practices which do not fit into the traditional categories in which legal systems perceive problems, and through which they operate. James Bohman has recently contrasted the present efforts to constitutionalize Europe with American experiences, and drawn a pertinent analogy: Europe is going through a 'constitutional mo- 
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administration' thesis submitted here, but is, at least at international level, not radical enough, because the barriers to conceptualising and realising a constitutionalization of transnational governance are significantly higher.
(2) These differences become apparent because the approaches tried out at WTO level and in the EU are very similar in their design.
(a) The formative era of the European Community is particularly instructive in this respect. Two answers to the -by now very famous -democracy deficits were developed, which have been important up to the present and have their equivalents at international level. One was the theory of the European Economic Constitution which legitimized -and restricted -European governance through supranationally valid commitments to economic freedoms, open borders and a system of undistorted competition.
The constitutional perspectives for the law of the WTO, which, in particular, ErnstUlrich Petersmann defends are anchored in this tradition. 61 They will not be discussed here because they do not deal with the type of regulatory concerns and governance arrangements that this essay focuses on. 62 As indicated, 63 we interpret markets as social institutions and are interested in their 'infrastructure', i.e., the web of formalized and semi-formal relations through which decisions are taken, which the economic theories of the functioning of markets do not address directly.
The second approach to European 'governance' was technocratic in that its exponents sought to defend -and to restrict! -European governance activities to a nonpolitical type of expertise. One contemporary version of this argument has been cited in the presentation of the new approach to harmonisation and standards. 64 Its most prominent equivalents at international level are 'expertise' and 'science'. There are many reasons for the attractiveness of such references, in particular, of 'scientific expertise'.
'Expertise' and 'science' claim a genuine authority in regulatory decision-making, which is, by its very nature, objective (neutral) and un-political. The standards of good science are not bound to some specific legal system which endorses the binding quality of scientific findings, but they are, by their very nature, transnationally valid. By resorting to scientific expertise, legal systems subject themselves to 'external' validity criteria (3) Is the weak transnational juridification of social regulation a bad thing that we should try to overcome? It is first of all important to acknowledge the normative arguments against stricter transnational legalization. Their core is that there is simply no political authority which would be entitled to take the same type of decisions for which constitutional states are legitimated. But it is then equally important to consider the re-75 Section I.2. 76 Sciulli 1992; and Joerges 2004a. 77 All of these aspects need to elaborated further to be situated properly in present debates. Their reliance (and dependence!) on societal law production may be particularly provocative in the eyes of public lawyers (like Stewart 2004; Kingsbury et al. 2004 ) and international lawyers (like Slaughter 2004: 216 ff.) . This reliance should, however, rather be understood read as a critique of overly optimistic readings of the reach and normative quality of public governance.
sponses that law can nevertheless help to organize. The most important among them is a conflict-of-laws inspired approach to the handling of legal differences which result in barriers to free trade. 79 The European experience is encouraging and can be developed further at WTO level. Conflicts between legal systems which become apparent in legal differences in the field of social regulation are usually multi-faceted. They concern political preferences, economic interests, industrial policy objectives, distributional politics, and ethical concerns. A proceduralising approach to such conflicts has the potential of discovering the nature of the differences and thereby identifying the conditions under which the free trade objective can be defended. The conceivable solutions will regularly be incomplete, in that they leave it to the concerned jurisdictions to deal with implications that cannot be handled at international level. The distributional implications of regulatory decisions are a case in point; their political implications tend to overburden the international system. A strategy of differentiating between the levels of governance, which decentralises the management of such difficulties, can be advantageous -provided that the international level proceeds with sufficient sensitivity to national concerns.
A balancing of competing 'governmental interests' is beyond the functions with which courts are equipped and legitimated to perform, Brainerd Currie has argued. 80 But 79 A long note on terminology could be inserted here which would have to cover at least three points.
(1) The first concern the notion of conflict of laws. The core issue of this discipline is in my understanding the task of dealing with validity claims which conflicts law should recognize as legitimate in principle. (2) The second step is the structural affinity between the conflict of law issue and the conflict between competing, yet legitimate objectives within the legal systems of constitutional states (or the EU respectively). Detaching the specific mode of thought in conflict of laws from traditional (Savignian) private international law and making it serve other areas of law, and in particular a social theory of law, was the great project of Rudolf Wiethölter, explained e.g. in Wiethölter 1977 . As Gunther Teubner (2003 explains, the point was no longer merely to reflect conflicts between national legal systems theoretically and cope with them in practice, but to generalize conflict-of-laws thinking itself in such a way as to make it yield results for conflicts between complexes of norms, areas of law and legal institutions, but also those between social systems, indeed even for divergences between competing social theories. This two-fold recourse to rich historical experience of private international law on the one hand and to competing theories of society on the other managed to establish 'conflicts of laws' as the central category for legal reconstruction of social contradictions. (3) The third step concerns the notion of 'proceduralization' (note 48 supra) and its use both within national legal systems and in postnational constellations. Too much for a footnote, to be sure. But by no means entirely idiosyncratic, as a fourth step could show, namely the similarity in substance of suggestions submitted in other (or similar!) suggestions. Suffice it here to point Armin von Bogdandys (2003: in his later writings, Currie has allowed for a 'moderate and restrained interpretation' of state interests so as to 'avoid' conflicts. 81 This concession comes close to the type of proceduralised conflict management advocated here. It is less juridical in one important respect: the search for conflict 'avoidance' is, at any rate within the EU, a constitutional duty. As Jona Israёl has recently put it: Article 10 EC has turned comity among the European nation states into a duty of co-operation. 82 The European system of multi-level governance is operating within legally defined limits. Law-mediated legitimacy of its new modes of governance (their 'constitutionalisation') is at least conceivable.
At WTO level, the transformation of comitas into mandatory commitments may be, to rephrase a famous reservation against the constitutionalization of the WTO, 'a step too far'. 83 Comity is a softer technique. It involves self-restraint in the assertion of jurisdiction and the application of the lex fori out of respect for foreign concerns. To invoke such commitments among WTO members is to suggest that court-like independent bodies -such as the WTO's Appellate Bodies -remain legitimised to promote amicable solutions to disputes where they cannot resolve them through adjudication. Comitas would suggest a search for a middle ground between law and politics by advising the latter to take the expertise of the former seriously, and by advising the former to be aware of the limited legitimacy of law that did or does not originate in a democratic process. Where the WTO has reached the borderlines of 'judicialization' and does not seem empowered to assess policies and economic interests, it may still function as forum and instigator of fair and workable compromises. What an ambivalent message, one may object. And yet, it seems quite instructive that, in such thorough interdisciplinary analyses as that of Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, 84 we observe the political scientist destroying the lawyer's normative claims and the lawyer questioning the practical sensibility of purely explanatory exercises. And one should note that the term 'law' is employed here not in a descriptive sense which would content itself with observing a quasi-statal degree of stability and compliance. In an understanding of law which carries with it the promise of justice, the two dimensions of the approach submitted here seek to do justice to the weakness of the law: 
